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ABSTRACT 
Despite the considerable research on strategic persistence, there remains a lack of 
understanding as to why companies persist with underperforming workers. Our study seeks to 
fill this gap in the literature by integrating the concepts of the paradox of success, external 
legitimacy, nepotism and the escalation of commitment perspectives to develop an integrated 
explanation for persistence with underperforming workers. Drawing on insights from two 
emerging economies in Africa: Ghana and Nigeria, we uncovered that persistence with 
underperforming workers stem from information hoarding, favouritism through tribalism and 
externally imposed constraints. Our study also articulates the underlying processes inherent in 
such persistence. The wider implications for theory and public policy are examined.  
Keywords: Africa; underperforming employees; human capital; underperforming workers; 
talent. 
 
 
3 
Introduction  
Over the past three decades, multiple streams of research have examined the productivity of 
workers and strategies to achieve better employee performance (Al Ariss, Cascio & Paauwe, 
2014; Yi, Nataraajan & Gong, 2011). One stream of research has focused on human capital 
development and skills upgrading as effective mechanisms for ensuring efficient utilisation of 
employees (Barnes, Ponder & Hopkins, 2015; Hayek, Thomas, Novicevic & Montalvo, 2016; 
Mellahi & Collings, 2010). Today’s highly competitive global environment has made 
competition for top talent a priority for many multinationals and small businesses in both 
developed and developing economies, thereby creating a hostile environment for 
underperformance (Amankwah-Amoah, Nyuur & Ifere, 2016; Collings & Mellahi, 2009). 
Many firms have utilised incentives such as higher salary and bonuses to attract and retain 
top talents as well as encourage superior job performance (Henagan & Bedeian, 2009). 
At the same time, some firms persist with underperforming workers and even refrain 
from taking steps to weed out underperforming workers (Mmieh et al., 2011; Shein, 2011; 
Taylor, 1998). Although the labour market in many advanced economies such as the US and 
Canada are associated with a “pay-for-performance” culture to motivate employees to 
achieve optimum outcome (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011), in many emerging economies 
“underperforming employees are typically left in post for several months or even years before 
any action is taken to address them” (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011, p. 1705). Despite decades 
of research by international business and strategy scholars on emerging economies, the 
existing literature has remained relatively silent as to why firms and managers persist with 
underperforming employees even under threat of worsening performance. The largely 
unexplored nature of this issue in emerging market context is puzzling given that the 
existence of underperforming workers can undermine the contribution levels of fellow 
workers (Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2007). More importantly, star performers can become targets 
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of underperformers, who can engage in acts to undermine their progress and success (see 
Henagan & Bedeian, 2009; Fiske, 2011). Our purpose in this study is to examine why firms 
persist with underperforming workers in emerging economies. We focus specifically on two 
emerging economies in Africa: Ghana and Nigeria, to shed light on the subject. The two 
countries are often regarded as the gateways to West Africa.  
This paper makes three main contributions to strategic human resources, international 
business and strategy research. First, although past studies have examined skill formation 
(Mellahi & Collings, 2010), they have failed to offer any robust explanations as to why firms 
persist with underperforming employees. In this direction, we integrate the concept of the 
paradox of success (Audia et al., 2000), legitimacy literature (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995) and “too much invested to quit” perspective (Teger, 1980) to develop a 
unified explanation for strategic persistence with underperforming workers.  
Another contribution is that we integrate insights on the effects of institutional and 
social pressures on human resource practices (See Chiang & Birtch, 2010; Hayek et al., 2016; 
Thomas & Inkson, 2007) with firm-level factors to develop an integrated framework of 
factors to explain persistence with underperforming workers. In addition, although firms that 
operate in high relational contexts are affected by different institutional factors (Peng, 2014), 
to date, studies have not incorporated these into our understanding of underperformance. 
Exploring this issue would help to not only enrich our cross-cultural understanding, but shed 
light on the more intricate processes through which strategic persistence occurs. In so doing, 
we capture the various factors that help to explain persistence with underperforming workers.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we present a review of the 
literature on the paradox of success, “too much invested to quit” perspective, nepotism and 
legitimacy. The research context and method are then examined. We then set out our findings 
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on underperforming workers. The final section outlines the implications for managers and 
international business research. 
Explanations for persistence with underperforming workers: a unified perspective   
For analytical clarity, underperforming workers are employees who have consistently 
performed below targets or previously agreed benchmarks over a period of time in their 
organisation (Shein, 2011). The underperformance has often been documented through a 
series of reviews by his or her line manager (Shein, 2011; Taylor, 1998). Some of the 
characteristics of such employees include lack of up-to-date communication skills, and lack 
of knowledge and expertise to perform in the current role (Taylor, 1998). Underperforming 
workers have been referred to as underperforming human resources or incompetent workers 
(Shein, 2011; Taylor, 1998).  
Four important streams of research are utilised to provide the foundation towards a 
better understanding of persistence with underperforming workers. First, we adopt the 
concept of the paradox of success (Audia et al., 2000; Miller, 1990) to develop a novel 
perspective on persistence with underperforming workers. The paradox of success is rooted 
in the “belief that a previously winning course of action will succeed in the future” (Audia et 
al., 2000, p. 850). A key tenet is that the workers develop what can be referred to as 
“idiosyncrasy credit” (Hollander, 1958) through their past performances, support and 
contributions to the past successes of the firm. Over time, this enables them to gain 
favourable or less severe consequences for persistent underperformance within the firm. The 
managers’ confidence in employees’ ability to replicate past successful performance leads to 
persistence with such workers. Another key premise of this line of research is that during 
their period of employment, underperforming workers build networks of relations and ties 
which enable them to form an emotional and psychological bond with the decision-maker. 
Over time, it becomes difficult to disentangle the links with their line managers in the wake 
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of persistent underperformance (see Amason & Mooney, 2008). By cultivating personal and 
workplace ties with powerful political actors, such workers are able to influence or curtail the 
consequence of their actions when dealing with underperformance (Forstenlechner & 
Mellahi, 2011).  
Related to this is the literature on nepotism/cronyism. Past studies have demonstrated 
that in many societies in emerging economies, nepotism and cronyism remain key features of 
employment relations, which ultimately influences managerial decisions and firm 
performances (Kamoche, 2000; Mekonan & Mamman, 2003; Ovadje & Ankomah, 2001). A 
body of research has suggested that hiring employees’ relatives instead of more qualified and 
unrelated applicants is prevalent and often justified on the basis that it helps to strengthen 
employees’ loyalty (Ovadje & Ankomah, 2001; Peng, 2014). Indeed, cronies have been 
shown to be “unreservedly loyal” and fully committed to the agenda of their sponsor (Ovadje 
& Ankomah, 2001). Studies have indicated that the existence of nepotism/cronyism can 
curtail organisational decision-makers’ actions and therefore their ability to act in the wake of 
underperformance (Mamman, Baydoun & Adeoye, 2009; Ovadje & Ankomah, 2001). A 
growing body of research suggests family businesses tendency to recruit relatives often 
deprive them of the opportunity to hire top talents (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). The close 
family ties then create barrier to weeding out underperforming relatives (Bertrand & Schoar, 
2006).  
Nevertheless, favouritism, tribalism, and racial and ethnic discrimination inherent in 
many developing countries have often provided a basis for leaders and managers to curtail 
their actions and persist with underperformance (Beugré, 2002; Beugré & Offodile, 2001). 
Another line of research suggests that informal and formal institutional factors such as local 
traditions, culture, law and norms would moderate or curtail the actions of managers when 
operating in emerging economies (see Beugré & Offodile, 2001; Peng, 2014). Accordingly, 
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nepotism can lead to misallocation of the firm’s limited resources and “unfair” decisions 
(Ovadje & Ankomah, 2001). Besides the benefits of forging strong ethnic ties in the 
workplace, tribalism and nepotism create conditions which make it difficult to “maintain 
principles of objectivity and meritocracy” (Ovadje & Ankomah, 2001, p. 184). 
Another  interesting line of research rooted in legitimacy literature (Baum & Oliver, 
1991; Suchman, 1995) has uncovered that firms may persist with underperforming employees 
or even hire local workers at a premium as a mere attempt to gain legitimacy in the local 
market (Forstenlechner & Mellahi, 2011; Sidani & Al Ariss, 2014). Such hiring of local 
workers enables multinationals to appear “local” and in attuned with local traditions and 
culture. Forstenlechner and Mellahi (2011) uncovered that multinationals in sectors where the 
employment level of nationals is low, hiring or persisting with local workers equipped 
multinationals to be able to extract concessions from the national government. As Baum and 
Oliver (1991: 187) pointed out so eloquently, “External legitimacy elevates the organisation’s 
status in the community, facilitates resource acquisition, and deflects questions about an 
organisation’s rights and competence to provide specific products or services.” Therefore, 
such external forces from the government can encourage firms to persist with the status quo.  
Research has also shown that trade unions have also used their collective bargaining 
powers to extract a wage premium for their members as well as protect underperforming 
workers from being fired (Atanassov & Kim, 2009; see also The Economist, 2011). Such 
external organisations are able to exert pressures which restrict managers’ ability to terminate 
employment of workers (Atanassov & Kim, 2009). Indeed, research has also demonstrated 
that poorly performing workers are less likely to be fired in an environment where there are 
strong union laws in tandem with weak investor protection (Atanassov & Kim, 2009; see also 
Shein, 2011). As Atanassov and Kim (2009, 342–343) put it, “Underperforming top 
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managers in low investor protection countries are more likely to retain their jobs as union 
power increases.”  
The “escalation of commitment” (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981) and the “too much 
invested to quit” perspective (Schwenk & Tang, 1989; Teger, 1980) also offer a theoretical 
lens to view how and why firms persist with underperformance. This line of research argues 
that “cost of strategic change”, i.e. firing underperforming workers, may simply be too high 
for some firms, forcing them to engage in strategic persistence (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014; 
Shein, 2011). This entails financial and non-financial costs such as training new employees, 
hiring costs, risks associated with new employees, risk of former employees filing lawsuits, 
compensation and redundancy pay as a result of strategic change (Shein, 2011). Related to 
the above is a stream of research which argued that persistence may stem from mere 
inefficiencies, poor information and poor communication flow within the focal firm (see 
Schwenk & Tang, 1989).  
Another relevant stream of research is the pay-for-performance literature. Past studies 
have demonstrated that pay-for-performance is strongly associated with superior individual 
and organisational performances (see Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau & Gerhart, 2003). One line 
of research has suggested that highly productive employees are more likely to opt for pay-for-
performance compensation, whereas, less productive workers often prefer fixed-salary 
compensation (Jensen, 2003). Accordingly, failure or inability to reward workers for their 
performance creates conditions, which discourage future performance leading to 
underperformance (see Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2007). Table 1 summaries the key features of the 
perspectives. Although firms persist with such workers, our understanding remains limited. 
Much of the existing literature has failed to offer a comprehensive explanation as to why 
companies persist with underperforming workers. Therefore, there is a need for a better 
understanding of underperforming workers. 
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------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Research method and analysis  
Research context 
In this section, we provide brief background information on Ghana and Nigeria as context 
and in help positioning the findings. Since gaining independences in the last century, both 
countries have emerged as leading forces in West African economic and political 
development (Jackson, 2004; Serkin, 2015). They have a flourishing private sector, 
experiencing economic growth. More importantly, they have been recognised as amongst the 
most promising emerging markets of this century (Serkin, 2015). Over the past two decades, 
African countries have recorded an unprecedented and sustained economic growth of 4.5 
percent annual average. Beegle et al. (2016) referred to these growths as “remarkably robust” 
especially when compared with the declining periods of the 1970s and 1980s when the 
continent was perceived as deeply entrenched in poverty and endemic in wars and famine 
(Beegle et al., 2016). This performance is stimulated by the institutionalisation of democratic 
dispensations, liberalisations, and efforts at good governance which together have culminated 
to the current focus on the continent as “Africa rising” (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2016; 
Beegle et al., 2016). Both countries have been among the favourite destination of substantial 
FDI inflows into the sub-West African region over the years (Nyuur & Debrah, 2014).  
Ghana and Nigeria gained independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively from the 
British government.  Shortly after this, these two countries recorded good economic growth 
up until the late 1960s. However, spates of political upheavals in the form of coup d’état 
contributed to the dwindling economic fortunes of these countries in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Moja, 2000). Ghana’s GDP has been hovering around 7% per annum since the early 2000s, 
only dipping to o 4% and 3.4% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, it is projected to recover and 
record a stronger growth rate of 8.2% in 2017 and 2018 (Beegle et al., 2016). Nigeria is 
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projected to maintain a 5.3 % GDP growth in 2017 and 2018 despite a dip to 3.3% GDP in 
2015 (Beegle et al., 2016). Ghana like other African countries is endowed with valuable 
minerals, such as gold and diamonds and its economy has been reliant on cocoa, gold, 
diamond and to some extent the recent discovery of oil in 2007 (Nyame & Grant, 2014). 
Nigeria on the other hand is the world’s eighth largest oil producer and the economy has been 
reliant on its huge oil wealth which still account for over 95% of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings (Agbiboa, 2012).  
Moreover, Nigeria has a population of 182 million people which positions it as the 
fifth most populated country in the world, and is projected to have 397 million people by 
2050 as the third most populated country after India, China, and the USA (Population 
Reference Bureau, 2015). Ghana’s population of 27.7 million people in 2015 also is projected 
to reach 37.7 million and 52.6 million people by 2030 and 2050 respectively (Population 
Reference Bureau, 2015). Majority of the current population in both countries are under 25 
years old and are therefore projected to constitute the economic workforce in the next decade. 
These demographics in both countries present an attractive environment for businesses in 
terms of a good source of labour force and an effective market for consumers. In the 2015 
World Banking ranking of 189 economies on the ease of doing business, Ghana and Nigeria 
occupied 114 and 169 positions respectively (World Bank, 2016).  
One of the key parameters in the rankings is the flexibility of the countries’ labour 
market regulatory frameworks relating to hiring, work scheduling and firing. These 
regulatory frameworks influence employers in decision making regarding dismissals, 
promotion, retraining, and reassigning employees (World Bank, 2016). The ranking of these 
two countries on this index suggests that there are some bottlenecks to smooth business 
operations and flexible labour regulatory framework in both countries particularly Nigeria 
and more efforts are required to enhance the situation. In 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index 
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by Transparency international, Ghana and Nigeria were ranked 56th and 136th respectively 
out of 167 countries around the world (Transparency International, 2015). Notwithstanding 
the gains chalked by these countries, corruption is identified as one of the main issues holding 
Nigeria back from its potential and contributing to the high poverty level of about 70% 
people living on less than $1 a day (Agbiboa, 2012). 
Method  
Given that the issue of underperforming workers and why firms persist with them remains 
largely unexplored within the international business, strategy and human resource literature, 
we adopted a qualitative approach to provide the depth of understanding (Birkinshaw, 
Brannen & Tung, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Siggelkow, 2007). Our 
work sought to generate theory rather than test theory. We adopted semi-structured 
interviews with human resource professionals, managers and decision-makers in both the 
public and private sectors. In line with recommendations of such studies in a high relational 
context of emerging economies, we utilised personal networks and the snowballing approach 
to help identify and trace managers and employees across multiple organisations (Acquaah, 
2007). The study also utilised networks within two African universities to help identify 
informants. Over an extended period, the authors interviewed business owners, managers, 
consultants, executives and investment bankers who are responsible for hiring, firing, 
managing and overseeing the work of employees. We also elicited views from professionals 
in sectors such as sales and marketing, financial services, warehousing, public sector 
organisations and operations management. Most of the informants are employees of global, 
regional and indigenous multinationals.  
We developed semi-structured interview questions to elicit the views of these 
professionals. To narrow down the scope of the study, the interviews covered the following 
broad areas. In the first set of questions, we focused on the informants’ employers, incentive 
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and rewards system, and decision-making processes. The questions also focused on the key 
challenges in the workplace, hiring and firing. We also asked the informants whether they 
managed or worked with any employee who had consistently underperformed over a long 
period of time. The final set of questions revolved around causes of underperformance, 
processes in dealing with underperformance, options in dealing with underperforming 
workers, why firms hung on to them, and their experiences and views. They were also asked 
about the difficulties in dealing with and managing underperforming workers including how 
the firm deals with early-warning signals of performance decline by employees. Some of the 
authors conducted the interviews from early 2014 to early 2015. On average, the interviews 
lasted around 60 minutes. Given the focus on two countries, we sought to ensure a greater 
level of consistency as well as a degree of flexibility to allow new insights to emerge 
(Robson, 2002).  
Data collection and analysis  
Given the sensitive nature of discussion of the status of co-workers and subordinates, many 
of the informants requested that we limit ourselves to note taking. This meant that extensive 
field notes were taken, transcribed verbatim and cross-checked with the informants to ensure 
accuracy. Following the “24-hour rule” (Eisenhardt, 1989), text and field notes were 
transcribed verbatim within 24 hours of each interview. This helped to establish a clear 
chronology of events and capitalise on the immediacy of our data (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; 
Whyte, 1994). Interview data were transcript coded into common themes and issues. In all, 
we conducted 61 interviews in both countries.  
To analyse our data, we employ a narrative strategy (Langley, 1999) by writing a 
detailed field note and summary for each informant covering the issues noted above. We 
developed a chronology and narrative accounts. We then looked for patterns and similarities 
in their responses, and then organised the data to allow meanings to be deduced. As observed 
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by Eisenhardt (1989, p. 541), “the juxtaposition of seemingly similar cases by a researcher 
looking for differences can break simplistic frames”. The data analysis replicated the 
inductive grounded theory development process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Sutton, 1991) 
which “requires that data and theory be constantly compared and contrasted throughout the 
data collection and analysis process” (Isabella, 1990, p. 12).The process led to classifications 
of responses into sections such as causes of underperformance, firms’ responses and 
persistence with underperformance. The interview data were supported with secondary data 
gleaned from sources such as press releases, internal documents, company websites, 
newspapers and additional materials provided by the informants. In presenting the findings, 
we used letter N to denote informants from Nigeria and letter G to denote informants from 
Ghana. Table 2 provides an overview of our times of data collection and data sources. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Findings and analysis 
Before we tease out why firms persist with such workers, we first provide a brief overview of 
some of the early-warning signals. Our study uncovered a number of early-warning signals 
leading to the identification of an underperforming worker. These include declining 
performance, lack of motivation and low productivity. An informant noted:  
“When they are unable to meet the agreed targets … At the beginning of every quarter, 
employees are assigned their task for the period.” (G11)   
Another informant elaborated:  
“I think inability to deliver results accurately and timely is the key indicator.” (N2)  
Favouritism through tribalism 
The field work revealed that workers’ upward movements, demotion and dismissal of 
underperforming workers appeared to be moderated by favouritism through tribalism and 
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corruption. The data suggest that virtually all the informants in public sector organisations 
emphasised that the most significant factor for the retention of underperforming employees in 
the public sector in Nigeria and Ghana is tribalism. By tribalism, we are referring to the 
tendency of managers and line managers to favour other employees from their tribe with 
regard to work practices such as firing, hiring and promotion (see Beugré & Offodile, 2001). 
This implies that superior officers or heads of establishments overlook the inefficiency of 
their subordinates if they belong to the same tribe. For instance, Nigeria is a traditional 
society in which the tribal units struggle for dividends of the country’s resources. An 
informant (N38), who has worked for a private sector organisation and is now in the public 
sector, stated that the pressure for conformance to tribal sentiment is higher in the public 
sector due to low requirements for leadership accountability. One informant in Ghana 
explained: 
“We have so many incompetent workers that you will not believe it … when you visit 
government department, you see blatant tribalism and favouritism everywhere … the Ewes 
protect Ewes, Asantes protect Asantes and Gas protect Gas (local tribes)… superiors of each 
protect their own kind and look the other way.” (G19) 
Our field work indicates that persistence with poor performance, corruption and 
governance is partly entrenched in tribalism. The informants observed that the slogan in the 
workplace environment in government agencies is “tribal politics remains alive and well” 
which corrupts decision making processes to the detriment of competent employees. In the 
setting of publicly-owned organisations, it has been suggested that departments often 
resemble the family and ethnic character of the senior official or minister (see also Ovadje & 
Ankomah, 2001). Tribe has been rendered more potent in both societies largely due to the 
fact that people have historically blamed other tribes for unemployment and poor education 
in another tribe. Some tribes are considered to be “lazy” and “shy away from work” which 
then provides the ammunition for some managers to seek to protect and preserve the job of 
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their fellow tribal members. There are often complex “tribe alliances” and mini groups who 
protect their kind. Many of the decision-makers are seen as “tribal champions” who advanced 
the interest of their kind often irrespective of competence. Another noted,  
“The government official said they have policy to have people from his ethic group so 
we cannot fire him.”  
An informant summarised the effects of tribalism by noting that, “It is sad that this 
society remains tribal … our agency hire people based on their tribe and when they do not 
perform we still keep them.” (G18) 
 “It’s the T-word … tribalism is the root of this problem in the public sector.” (G17) 
Some of the informants attributed persistence to favouritism. As some informants noted: 
“I think it stems from both favouritism and tribalism. My co-worker has benefited from this.” 
(N10) 
 “Most often the employees are a family relation to the owner of the company or he or she is 
in the ‘good books’ of his supervisor.” (G3)  
Our analysis suggests that cultural traditions and relational ties also perpetuate 
persistence with underperforming workers. Many of the managers had developed and forged 
closer relationships with their subordinates which then become a barrier to terminating their 
relations and the employment of the close friend. Some of the informants and key decision-
makers appeared to be particularly more concerned about maintaining personal ties and 
relationships rather than maintaining organisational success and survival. One informant puts 
it this way: 
“My job is to ensure that the company keeps a very good book. I also ensure that every naira 
spent is accounted for in the company ... Employees who were recruited through connection 
are always difficult to sack … Yes! We have reduced the salaries of those employees and kept 
them on.” (N22)  
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 “It may be sentiment as a result of emotional attachments that have grown over the years. It 
may also be that they are the connection to major customers/contributors.” (N2) 
Based on the above analysis of favouritism and tribalism, we offer the following 
propositions: 
Proposition 1a: Tribalism is more likely to create conditions for underperformance to 
ferment in developing economies with different tribes. 
Proposition 1b: Tribalism influences management decisions to persist with 
underperforming employees in public sector organisations in developing economies 
with different tribes.  
Relationship and personal ties  
Our findings further suggest that indigenous managers are often unwilling to sever workplace 
and family ties. Such ties are seen to offer institutional support and security beyond the 
workplace. For many of the informants, terminating the employment of underperforming 
workers is seen as severing ties with the person. Therefore, the emotional burdens that can 
befall the person lead to persistence with the employee in the face of the evidence. Some of 
the informants noted that they have often sidestepped the decision to weed out such workers 
to maintain their personal and family relationships. We further observed that Ghanaian and 
Nigerian societies are collectivist in nature and as such workers or employees tend to develop 
“strongly knitted social ties and feel a sense of obligation to their kith and kin” (Mmieh et al., 
2011, p. 424; Jackson, 2004). These networks of ties in relationships then influence firm 
behaviour and managers’ freedom to act. 
“I also think personal relationships make it difficult to fire incompetent employees.” (N33) 
The analysis of interview data suggests that the paternal culture by which employers 
treat employees as their children was highlighted by a number of the respondents as a key 
factor that led to retention of underperforming employees in the Nigerian environment. The 
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pull towards personal wellbeing, which typifies the paternal culture, overrides corporate 
interest and objectives. Informants who work for entrepreneurial organisations were 
unanimous in pointing to family ties between owners and some employees as the cause of 
retention of underperforming employees. An informant who owns a travel agency (N41) said 
she retains underperforming employees who are family members because she would still 
meet their financial needs if they were sacked, stressing that “in Nigeria, you are your 
brother’s keeper”. She also pointed to honesty and loyalty as trade-off for job performance in 
her organisation. As another informant elaborated:  
“Every time we tried to sack him (elderly worker) he brought up stories of his family. In the 
end, we kept him with new duties.” (G17)   
As Mmieh et al. (2011, p. 424) put it,  
“The Ghanaian worker extends the institutional cultural traits of high esteem to authority, 
hierarchy, acceptance of status differentials, and respect for elders and positions in the 
workplace … managers/elders in position are expected to exercise constraint in reprimanding 
and/or weeding out underperforming workers in the workplace.”  
One of the informants specifically emphasised the effect of the drive to maintain relationships 
which has resulted in retaining an ineffective sick employee for over two years in his 
organisation. He said: 
“This employee is being retained despite the fact that the period specified in the extant 
employment rules for light duties has been exceeded and he is supposed to be retired.”(N40).  
The complexities characterising this issue in many Sub-Saharan African countries is 
also captured by Ovadje and Ankomah (2001, p. 184) who noted that often an employee 
facing disciplinary action could direct a delegation of elders encompassing cultural and local 
potentates to the home of the line manager or supervisor to plead on behalf of the ‘victim’ as 
well as remind him or her of the potential “economic and social damage the impending 
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disciplinary action will do to the person’s family (both immediate and extended), kinsmen, 
village or even entire ethnic group”. 
Another respondent observed that in his organisation, employees who are relations of 
the managing directors do not face any consequence for persistent underperformance. 
Rewards such as promotions are based on informal relationships rather than job performance. 
An informant (N40) who works for a multinational oil company revealed that some of his 
colleagues who underperform rely on the worker’s union leaders for protection from being 
sacked. They also rely on collective bargaining where uniform wage increases negotiated by 
the employees’ union on behalf of their members reward low and high performers equally as 
they can hardly achieve reasonable performance-based compensation. These inequities 
impact negatively on productivity as high performers are discouraged and could lead to a 
vicious cycle of persistent underperformance of employees. Based on the above analysis, we 
offer the following propositions: 
Proposition 2a: Relational and social ties are more likely to curtail managerial 
actions when dealing with underperforming workers. 
Proposition 2b: Older underperforming employees are less likely to be actioned by 
younger managers than younger underperforming employees. 
Non-profit motives of the employer  
Another important aspect of our findings relates to the role of government and state-owned 
agencies. We uncovered that, largely due to non-profit motives of some organisations, 
persistence with underperforming workers was not frowned upon. Most of the informants 
noted that the government agencies and non-governmental sector have become a sanctuary 
for many incompetent workers. Another informant in Nigeria (N36), who is a head of 
department in a government establishment, argued that the main objective of government 
involvement in economic activities is creation of employment and provision of goods and 
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services to the citizenry at affordable prices. His organisation therefore retains 
underperforming employees in line with the deliberate policy of government to keep citizens 
in employment as a means of meeting individuals’ needs and avoiding social unrest. Over the 
years, government agencies in both countries have also become a sanctuary for incompetence 
and underperforming workers. Many employees have secured their jobs on the basis of 
political connections. Consequently, “jobs for life” and allotment of management posts on the 
basis of political affiliation has become very common. As one informant in Ghana explained: 
“Yes! We have some workers who do not have the right skills or educational qualification, so 
they can’t be fired … they are also not good at the job. They were placed here by the ‘boss’ 
(senior politician).” (G20) 
 Another Nigerian concurred by noting that:  
“There is really no incompetent employee here (current firm) … a few months ago, I visited a 
government agency and found three of the people we fired earlier in the year there. They said 
they had no pressure to perform or even carry out their duties.” (N8) 
 One of them who works for a public organisation in Lagos (N39) asserted:  
“There is no motivation for performance improvement as rewards are not based on 
performance but patronage.”  
One explanation for this is that so long as their political masters remain in power, job 
security is assured, irrespective of their performance on the job. This has created an 
atmosphere where such workers’ performances bear no relation to their level of rewards. 
Another informant from the private sector noted: 
“I will always fire an incompetent worker because he/she has nothing to offer. One bad seed 
can destroy the business … We have fired plenty employees who could not meet their targets. 
Those former employees responded by looking for less strict jobs in government.” (N23) 
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Government agencies have also provided avenues for such workers to be transferred 
to on cases where the incompetence becomes so disruptive for the department. An employer 
(N37) who described herself as a social entrepreneur said she simultaneously pursues both 
economic profit and social objectives. She sees some of her underperforming employees as 
being from poor or disadvantaged backgrounds who should be kept in employment and 
developed through training and mentoring. Based on the above analysis, we offer the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Firms focusing on non-profit objectives are more likely to create 
conditions for persistence with underperforming workers. 
Information hoarding 
Our findings suggested that some regional managers deliberately desist from sharing 
information about underperformance in an attempt to conceal their contributions and thereby 
creating conditions for strategic persistence to occur. Many of the informants attributed 
managers’ ability to keep underperforming workers in their places of employment to 
“information hoarding”, where they decide not to communicate or withhold information 
about a subordinate’s persistent underperformance to the superiors. By being able to hoard 
such information or failure to volunteer performance information, line managers contribute to 
keeping underperforming workers in their jobs. As one head of government agency asserted: 
“I cannot act in the vacuum … if people send me information (incorrect) that everyone is 
doing well then I cannot sanction anyone. This is the root of the problem.” (G16) 
As another informant noted:   
“Sometimes we have to wait a long time before getting a report (on job performance) from 
our branches … we can only act quickly if the information arrives on time.”  (G18) 
Government bureaucracies in both countries were also identified as a major factor in 
restricting flow of knowledge about underperformance from local branches to headquarters. 
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Such intentional practices create conditions for persistence with underperformance to occur. 
The information asserted that efficient organisation of their firms relies heavily on diffusion 
of information from the branches to headquarters. Lack of effective flow not only affects 
quality decision making but also creates conditions to maintain the current course of action. 
Thus, we propose:  
Proposition 4: Information hoarding is more likely to lead to poor attributions of 
underperformance and persistence with underperforming workers. 
External forces  
Our data indicate that across the two countries, some firms have kept underperforming 
workers as a “bridging strategy” to build bridges with local communities. By originating from 
a particular ethnic group, such individuals are seen to bring a degree of legitimacy to their 
firms. For firms desperately seeking legitimacy in the community, keeping such workers 
provides a means of demonstrating their engagement to the local community. Such 
individuals also act as joints and protect their firms from accusations of exploiting the local 
community. Some workers in this category represented symbolic tokens to convince locals 
that the firm represented their values and traditions. As one foreign-owned business co-owner 
noted: 
“When we moved the business here, some of the locals did not like us and even threatened 
our business … so we have two workers that can be seen as ‘underperforming’ but they have 
strong links in the community – that is why we have kept them … they are helping us to 
reduce the tension.” (G15) 
Another informant concurred: 
“Yes! A decade ago … his incompetence caused the company a fortune including the cost of 
his retraining and coaching. The other staff were not pleased with the decision … he was a 
native of the area and we kept him in the business.”(G6) 
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Other external factors 
Our findings also suggest that managers/owners of firms with poorly performing individuals 
often have a desire to improve efficiency by firing such individuals. However, they have been 
unable to do so particularly due to the strong potential influence from government officials. 
Although the contributions of such workers are often non-existent within the firm, any 
attempt to terminate their employment could lead to sudden changes in government policy or 
contracts of which the firm is a beneficiary. One informant noted:  
“As soon as we issued him a notice (letter) that his contract was under threat due to poor 
performance, his ‘contact’ in government informed us that our contract with them was under 
review … after three weeks it became clear to us so we decided to withdraw the notice … It 
then came as no surprise when a government official contacted us to say that it was a false 
alarm.” (G14)  
This informant also noted that the employee has been kept for more than a year, not 
because of his contribution to the business, but because of his contacts which helped them to 
maintain the government contract. In this informant’s experience, the worker came to be 
designated as part of the “protected group” of workers, who in theory could not be fired 
because of the risk of losing contracts and connections with government officials to the 
business. To some co-workers, the continuous employment of such individuals is shrouded in 
mystery into which they have limited insight.   
By the same token, the data from Nigeria also suggest that many of those interviewed 
pointed to corruption as one of the main reasons why organisations persist with 
underperforming employees in Nigeria. Many pointed out that underperforming employees 
are not only retained in employment, but promoted because of their loyalty in paying 
“homage” and presenting gifts as bribes to those in leadership positions. When the 
interviewer told them that corruption existed in all parts of the world, virtually all the 
informants retorted that it is a norm rather than an exception in Nigeria. 
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Another aspect of our findings indicates that some of the workers were recruited by 
the new executive teams and portrayed as the up-and-coming star performers. Over time such 
workers failed to deliver and eventually came to be seen as underperforming. However, some 
of the top management often fail to admit defeat and worry that firing such workers could 
damage their reputation and judgement. Consequently, the executive persist with such 
workers to protect their reputation. As one informant noted: 
“They just want to save face … XXX employed him two years ago but we haven’t seen 
anything yet … XXX won’t fire him.” (G14)  
A director of a major automobile marketing company in Lagos (N39) referred to some 
aspects of organisational culture as being responsible for the persistence of underperforming 
employees in his organisation. He said the fear of diffusion of business secrets, especially by 
senior managers, has led to keeping them as employees even when they have begun to 
underperform. Table 3 provides a summary of how underperforming workers have come to 
be viewed as “imposed workers” and possessing “unfulfilled potentials”. As illustrated in the 
table, persistence with underperforming workers can stem from their imposition from an 
external force over which management have limited or no control. In some of the case of the 
oil multinationals, persistence were at time attributed to governmental contracts requiring 
foreign firms to have a quota of local employees. As one government official (N36) in 
Nigeria with several years of experiences noted, 
“We make it clear to them (Western multinationals) that they have to hire more local workers 
not only labourers, but also as senior managers, if they want to succeed here”.  
This guideline was noted to have influenced demand for executive-level and blue-collar 
employees but more importantly created some kind of “protection” for some 
underperforming senior managers given the competition for such talent. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
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Our findings here lead us to the following summary proposition: 
Proposition 5: Employees who enjoy special status are more likely to be retained 
after persistent underperformance. 
Cost of training 
Our analysis also indicates that the costs of training and relational ties are some of the reasons 
why firms persist with such workers. For many small businesses, the high costs of training 
and recruiting well-educated workers have forced them to keep some underperforming 
workers, as illustrated in Table 4. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
The study suggests that, cumulatively, persistence with underperforming workers stems not 
only from external forces but also internal factors such as relational ties and idiosyncrasy 
credits, as depicted in Figure 1.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Discussion and implications  
The primary question that we have addressed in this study is why firms persist with 
underperforming workers. Drawing on insights from two emerging economies in Africa: 
Ghana and Nigeria, we uncovered that persistence with underperforming workers stems from 
factors such as information hoarding, favouritism through tribalism, “idiosyncrasy credit”, 
externally imposed constraints and escalation of commitment. Interestingly, we have 
uncovered evidence to advance the notion that ethnic ties and tribalism play an influential 
role in the decision by managers to persist with underperforming workers. Another broad 
category of sources of persistence stems from the emotional bond created between 
supervisors and subordinates. The existence of such ties constrained managers’ ability to act 
in the face of persistent poor performance. It also stems from firms’ attempt to gain and retain 
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political ties and “special privileges”. In addition, we uncovered that outside the work 
environment, some of such workers are utilised as a means of gaining legitimacy and 
cultivating trust with the local politicians.  
Contributions to theory and practice 
Regarding theoretical implications, although strategic persistence has attracted a body of 
research (Audia et al., 2000; Schwenk & Tang, 1989), there remains a lack of understanding 
as to why companies persist with such workers. Our study seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature by integrating theoretical concepts (i.e. the paradox of success, external legitimacy, 
nepotism/cronyism and the “escalation of commitment” (Staw, 1981) in helping to offer a 
more robust explanation of the subject. The integrated nature of the study accentuates the 
robustness of examining issues in this research domain using multiple and integrative 
approaches, instead of the narrow theoretical focus usually adopted in this research. This 
approach adds to and extends previous research that examined these theoretical perspectives 
separately. Second, the study proposed an enhanced unified framework of impelling forces 
driving the incidence of persistence with underperforming employees in organisations. The 
proposed unified framework in this study also provides a basis for scholars to further evolve 
and develop an even more integrative perspective of the issues.  
Another potential implication of our findings is that “laws in many developing 
countries favour employees as they are seen as the 'weaker' party in the organization-
employee relationship” and therefore they have weak bargaining power and ability to 
influence employers. In light of increasing global competition and needs to improve 
government efficiency, government laws might have indirectly created conditions for 
persistence with such workers. Finally, the finding that public sector institutions and non-
profit organisations are more likely to persevere with underperforming employees in this 
high-relational context is novel and adds to the literature.  
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From a managerial standpoint, our analysis indicates that the ability to identify early 
warning signals of seriously underperforming workers can help reduce later resources 
required to undo or repair the damage to the business. There is a need to create an effective 
mechanism to upgrade the expertise and knowledge of seriously underperforming and 
“difficult to fire” employees to help reduce potential losses to the business.  In addition, 
weeding out underperforming workers can boost confidence of co-workers which would 
impact on overall firm performance. This is also consistent with the assertion that weeding 
out underperforming workers can equip firms to mitigate prolonged poor performance. More 
importantly, weeding out such workers boosts confidence of co-workers. For firms in such 
high-relational contexts, there is a need to identify an effective mechanism for dealing with 
underperforming workers without imposing an additional burden on the decision-maker such 
as the possibility of severing all ties with the individual.  
Limitations and directions for future research   
The study has some limitations worth noting. First, we focus on just two countries with a 
small number of informants. This means that the findings might not be generalised to other 
emerging market contexts or other African settings. This limitation opens an avenue for 
future study to seek a much larger sample from multiple countries. Second, our study focused 
mainly on underperforming workers which some firms might construe in a different way. 
Such analysis would help to test the limit of our findings. Another area worthy of further 
scholarly works is the need to examine the relationship between underperforming workers 
and underperforming companies. It may be that a lack of decisiveness in dealing with 
underperforming workers breeds mistrust and causes co-workers to underperform, thereby 
undermining the business and precipitating failure. Such analysis would not only shed light 
on human capital development strategies but also help to offer a more robust explanation of 
the processes leading to business failure in emerging economies (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). 
It is also worth noting that local employment, labour and contract law also play a pivotal role 
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in curtailing managerial actions. In this paper, we largely steer away from such explanations. 
It is also worth noting that shortage of top talent in developing countries also forces firms to 
retain such workers even in the face of underperformance (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-
Mejia, 2000). Future research might seek to conduct a comparative study of such laws in the 
two countries and beyond to help develop our understanding of the subject.  
Another fruitful line of research would be to examine the responses of 
outperformers/top stars to persistence with underperforming workers. Such analysis would 
help to enrich our understanding of whether outperformers become demotivated and alter 
their routines and contributions in such high-relational contexts. Such analysis might also 
yield other possible explanations for persistence with such workers beyond the findings 
presented here. There is also a need for future studies to examine the effects of industry and 
organizational size on our findings. We hope that this study fosters further lines of research in 
this area. 
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Table 1: An overview of our construct   
Features The paradox of 
success 
Legitimacy 
perspective  
The “escalation of 
commitment” perspective  
Nepotism/cro
nyism 
Key 
premise 
Emphasis on firm-
level factors as 
explanation of 
strategic persistence. 
Workplace ties can 
become barriers to 
change. 
Relationship between 
employees curtails 
managers’ latitude to 
act.   
External legitimacy 
can provide access to 
resources and foster 
social acceptance in 
new markets. 
Contends that barriers to 
exit from the status quo 
stems from both internal and 
external factors. 
Switching cost is very high.  
Nepotism/cron
yism curtails 
organisational 
decision-
makers’ 
actions and 
ability to act in 
the face of 
underperforma
nce. 
Limitation  Focused mainly on 
organisational factors 
and attributed current 
failures to past 
successes. 
Focused on firm–
environment interface 
but paid inadequate 
attention to firm-level 
constraints. 
Paid inadequate attention to 
firm-level factors. 
It overlooks 
firm-level 
factors in 
determining 
performance. 
A unified 
approach  
Integration of the perspectives.  
 
Table 2: Overview of data collection and sample    
Features Profile and description  
Countries of focus Ghana and Nigeria.  
Job positions  Executives/directors, line managers, heads of departments, human 
resources/administrative managers and employees.  
Organisations  Indigenous and foreign multinationals in areas such as oil, 
insurance and accounting, management consulting, advertising 
agencies and investment banks 
Medium-size enterprises and public sector organisations.  
Data collection 
timeline 
From early 2014 to mid-2015. 
Total  Ghana (N=20) and Nigeria (N=41). 
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Table 3: Quotations illustrating underperforming workers as imposed workers 
Steps Exemplary quotations from the fieldwork  
Imposed 
employees  
“Companies hang onto incompetent employees because those employees are imposed on the company by either politicians, 
influential people and former directors of the company.”(N12) 
“Some of our colleagues here call them the ‘untouchables’. They have no idea how the business operates and yet they are 
protected from being fired by ‘outside forces’.” (G14) 
“Some incompetent employees in the bank have big contacts who bring very large deposits, as a result of that the bank might 
retain them despite her weaknesses.” (N23) 
“Incompetent employees should be sacked because they are counter-productive to the organisation … but someone protects them 
here.” (N12) 
“Yes. The company has a culture of overlooking most of this … managers overlook the competencies of non-direct reports and 
blame the direct reports for not being good supervisors.” (N5) 
Officials 
“mandates” 
“The law in this area discourages termination of employment on the basis of incompetence. The employer would have to train 
and re-train.” (G10) 
“I think it stems from favouritism.” (N10) 
“Because those employees are relatives of the CEO.” (N23) 
Unfulfilled 
potential 
and hidden 
talent 
“None, we only do not fire when we identify a skill in the person that may be needed in another department.” (G3) 
“Employees perceived as not having the right set of skills are usually reassigned to other roles in the short term.” (N6) 
 “Some employees are introduced to new techniques, skills and refresher courses to help improve their performance and the 
overall (global) productivity of the business.” (G6)  
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Table 4: Quotations illustrating cost of training 
Dimension  Illustrative quotes 
Cost of 
training 
“The cost of hiring new staff is higher than it costs to maintain existing staff. New 
staff will take time to learn the organisation’s processes, which may delay or affect the 
organisation’s output.” (N4)  
“It takes a lot to fire staff due to the nature of the work we do. We give a lot of room 
for improvement. However, the only factors that can influence a decision to not fire an 
incompetent employee might be cost. The cost of keeping him/her might be less than 
hiring a more experienced person and if the organisation is convinced of his/her 
remorse.” (N2) 
“Relationships and the cost of training new employees are the main barriers here.” 
(N16) 
Personal 
ties 
“Personal ties with such employees make it difficult to sack him.” (N21) 
“The company organises training on new insurance products in order to enhance 
employees’ product knowledge in the industry and to make them become competitive 
among their peers.” (N31) 
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Figure 1: A framework of impelling forces of persistence with underperforming employees 
 
 
